University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1976

A Brief Inquiry into the Imperatives of the Coastal Zone and the
Processes of Institutional Change . . . .
Robert I. Reis
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert I. Reis, A Brief Inquiry into the Imperatives of the Coastal Zone and the Processes of Institutional
Change . . . ., 1 Sea Grant L.J. 5 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/774

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

A Brief Inquiry into the
Imperatives of the Coastal
Zone and the Processes of
Institutional Change ....
Robert I. Reis
The ebb and flow of the tide marks only the surface of biological and legal
flux in the coastal zone. The physical and biological revelations of the 1960's
and 1970's, and the attempted responses of the legal system to the imperatives
thereby postulated, have given rise to a set of legal, ethical, and processual
questions even more difficult to conceptualize than their physical counterparts
-the realities of the coastal zone that prompted them.
Coastal area decisionmaking involves a set of institutional norms that
have long informed perceptions of coastal area processes, but that no longer
respond to or serve contemporary needs. This is not surprising, since the
"wastelands" of the 1950's and early 1960's have become the priceless ecological gems' of the 1970's-"wetlands," "mudflats," "swamps," and "bogs"
have become synonymous with values of a status almost beyond questioning.
Belated recognition of the enormous ecological value of these areas has led to
frenetic, crisis-born attempts to stave off their destruction. 2 During the late
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1. This concept of wetlands as wastelands was reflected in two separate but equally interesting
situations. The first was in testimony before the National Commission on Urban Problems by
Ozmore, in his Plea For Wetlands Protection:
At one time not too many years ago, the marshlands of our country were referred to
as "wastelands." Nothing could be further from the truth. Our wetlands literally
teem with life, from the lowest form of amoebic animals to the fur-bearing mammals
which have meant millions of dollars to our population. They are the nursery
grounds for most of our protein supply from the sea.
3 HEARINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS 204
at 205 (July-August 1967). Cf. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
wherein the Corps was ordered by the court to re-evaluate the Wallisville and Trinity River
projects and prepare a new Environmental Impact Statement concerning the project. The
prior report could be characterized as evidencing a bias toward minimizing the value of and
impact on the affected wetlands and fisheries. The decision is a delightful disclosure of the
machinations of inner decisionmaking and traditional weightings inherent in Corps cost
benefit studies.
2. A limited insight into the depth of feeling evoked by wetlands preservation can be gleaned
from the following quotation:
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1960's and early 1970's, statutes were enacted by the legislative bodies of several states, and the flow of case law increased to a cascade exceeding all expectation.3 Congress enacted a steady progression of laws: the Coastal Zone Management Act," the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act,5 the National
Estuarine Act, 6 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act7 and Amendments."
The new mythology of coastal area values was so firmly rooted in emerging public policy that the pronouncements of state and federal legislation read
like codifications of the postulates of biological imperative and impending irretrievable resource loss. Wetlands preservation and coastal zone management
are premised on real and demonstrable ecological values,9 and the process of
legitimating these values through legislation was undertaken in the haste that
such critical values require. If the postulates were justified, no time should be
lost in implementing measures designed to preserve wetlands and protect them
from further despoliation, needless destruction, and loss.
The earth, its habitats, and its inhabitants are all of one piece. But if a person were
forced to select the most important natural habitat on earth, the answer would have
to be the estuary-where most of the land is under water, where the river is no longer
river, the ocean not yet ocean, but where life thrives as nowhere else.
It is often said rather vaguely that life began in the sea .... It is much more likely
that the birthplace of life was an estuary, a highly enriched environment where the
wastes of the continents, silts, clays, dissolved solids and gases could be combined in
the presence of gently ebbing and flowing tides that kept nutrients supplied and
wastes diluted.
Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Comm. on MerchantMarineand Fisheries,90th Cong., 1st Sess., 442, 443 (1967). See
also Heath, EstuarineConservationLegislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV.
351, at 351, 352 (1970). The Supreme Court of Connecticut in Brecciaroli v. Commissioner
of Environmental Protection, 36 CONN. L.J. 5 (1974), noted "both... the importance
of wetlands as natural resources and... their imminent demise at the hands of man."
Id. at 6. The Rhode Island Supreme Court was somewhat called upon in Mills, Inc. v.
Murphy, 352 A.2d 661 (1976), to distinguish between Freshwater and Tidal Wetlands Acts
and procedures. In doing so, the court noted the different pressures and policies attendant on
different forms of environmental regulation as follows:
The Coastal Wetlands Act envisions affirmative action on the part of the Department of Natural Resources to the end of establishing a statewide plan for the protection of wetlands. The instant Act, on the other hand, sets out a permit procedure
whereby the landowner is required to initiate the proceedings. This difference in
overall approach is susceptible to a variety of reasonable explanations: the greater
development pressure on coastal wetlands suggests the need for immediate state action while the situation regarding fresh water wetlands might not be so pressing; the
high incidence of state-ownership in coastal wetlands might facilitate centralized
action while the almost exclusively private ownership of fresh water wetlands would
tend to hinder such an approach; the probable interdependence and interactions of
coastal wetlands could necessitate unitary state action while the more random pattern of fresh water wetlands might thwart such an attempt.
Having in mind the need for significantly different approaches to the regulation
of fresh and salt water wetlands, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the
two methods of regulation posed dangers of differing magnitude to the rights of private individuals. Thus they may have decided that a statewide program of affirmative action, being less sensitive to individual circumstances, required the inclusion of
prior hearings and a provision for compensation, while a procedure that envisioned
the processing of a series of individual applications required only the availability of
judicial review to ensure the protection of all constitutional rights, including that of
just compensation. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the classifications
created by the Legislature lack all rational basis.
Id. at 668-69.

Imperatives of the Coastal Zone

3. See generally Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1973); Zabel v. Tabb,
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); State v. Johnson, 365 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); MacGibbon. v.
Board of Appeals, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe, Inc., 349 Mass. 204, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
4. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1974). See also U.S. Dep't of
the Interior, National Estuarine Pollution Study, S. DOC. No. 58, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
5. Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11 (1974). For an analysis of expenditures under the Act see National Outdoor Recreation Programs and Policies,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, H. R.,93d Cong., Ist Sess., at 383-400 (1973).
6. National Estuarine Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1223-26 (1974).
§ 1221. Congressional declaration of policy.
Congress finds and declares that many estuaries in the United States are rich in a
variety of natural, commercial, and other resources, including environmental
natural beauty, and are of immediate and potential value to the present and future
generations of Americans. It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to provide a
means for considering the need to protect, conserve, and restore these estuaries in a
manner that adequately and reasonably maintains a balance between the national
need for such protection in the interest of conserving the natural resources and
natural beauty of the Nation and the need to develop these estuaries to further the
growth and development of the Nation. In connection with the exercise of jurisdiction over the estuaries of the Nation and in consequence of the benefits resulting to
the public, it is declared to be the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the responsibilities of the States in protecting, conserving and restoring the estuaries in the United States.
7. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
8. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1975).
9. However real and demonstrable ecological values have been, absorbing them into a workable
legal context has been a traditional problem. At least a partial solution may be seen in the
work of Odum & Skjei, The Issue of Wetlands Preservation and Management: A Second
View, I COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 150 (1974), wherein the authors attempt to
quantify some of the ecological values of wetlands. Some form of quantification of ecological
values is necessary for the balancing of conflicting interests in any decisionmaking context.
This is particularly appropriate for agency or judicial decisionmaking affecting wetlands
development. Thus, one could sdy that the development of a legal context involves the integration of ecological and economic analysis. A significant problem arises at this point, in that the
traditional legal/economic context has involved the impact of agency restrictions on the use
value of property to private individuals. To justify the integration of economic/environmental
values, one must be concerned with public sector values.
It is only recently that a balancing of public sector outcomes has been proposed as an integral part of the administrative or judicial process which determines the validity of police
power regulations. The court in Rykar v. Gill, the first and withdrawn opinion of which apappears at 6 E.R.C. 1333 (Conn. Super. 1973), acknowledged this recent standard when it
remanded the case to the Commissioner of Environmental Protection as follows on July 18,
1975:
The plaintiff's application and alternative proposals are to be considered in light of
the rule that in the regulation of private property the welfare of the public, rather
than private [sic] gain is of paramount consideration provided that the regulation
does not so restrict the use of private property for any reasonable purpose as to result
in a "practical confiscation."
Unreported remand (emphasis added). The italicized language is an adaption of the language
of the court in Brecciaroli v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 36 CONN. L.J. 5
(1974). Therein, the Supreme Court of Connecticut worked a progression of reasoning from
the Connecticut General Statutes §§ 22a-33, which sets forth the general public policy of
"public health and welfare" considerations, through the aforenoted language in the remand
order, culminating in the court's upholding the denial of the landowner's application for a
permit to develop because "it merely prohibited one specific use which presumptively was not
reasonable when balanced against the public harm it would create. "Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
The implications of both the quantification and balancing process are great strides forward
in the realization of these goals or objectives which are "premised on real and demonstrable
ecological values."
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However, the quantum shift from zero value to enormous value occurred
so suddenly and unexpectedly that the normal process of judicial and legislative maturation in response to changes in contemporary values and beliefs
could not occur. The small, deliberate, incremental changes in traditional definitions and conceptions of private property, the expansion of the bounds of

police-power regulation, and the emergence of mechanisms for the acquisition
of coastal area lands and the vesting of control over them in the public sector
never occurred in the orderly fashion that characterizes most legal change.' 0
10. To some extent the tone of legal analysis reflects some of this difference in the process of judicial and legislative change of basic values. A position is often assumed in regard to the subject
of analysis which does not necessarily reflect the underlying nature of the change that is advocated. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J.BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973);
Jaffee, The Public Trust Doctrineis Alive and Kicking in New Jersey Tidalwaters:Neptune
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea-A Case of Happy Atavism?, 14 NAT. RES. J. 309 (1974). The
most interesting analysis is found in 1 & 2 V. YANNANCONE & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1971), wherein the authors advocate that these
concepts must be argued in every court of the land. They note in the midst of their publik trust
discussion:
The Trust Doctrine must be urged in as many courts in the land as will listen. Suits
must be brought each time a smoke stack spewing forth sulphur dioxide threatens to
degrade the quality of the air that belongs to all of us; each time the waste from a
paper mill pollutes the water we drink; each time a pesticide or herbicide contaminates the air, water or vegetation we own in common; each time a "fastbuck" developer landfills a wetland or estuary to the detriment of the important balance of our
food chain; and each time a governmental authority callously decides to build a road
or other public project in such manner as to threaten the integrity of the ecosystem
involved.
I id.at 17.
On the question of the future of private property, the authors are equally purposeful in their
advocacy:
There need be no hesitation on the part of the environmental advocate to seek to
curtail the private use of any property which is cloaked with the public interest. The
landowner's right to just compensation for property given by the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution must be balanced against the right
of the people to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of national and natural resource
treasures as trusts for the People, not only of this generation, but of those generations yet unborn.
And,
[tihere is ample precedent for the taking of private property in the absence of
eminent domain proceedings and without just compensation. The regulation and
control of the uses to which property may be put often constitutes a taking where the
effect of such regulation is so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his
interest in the property.
Id. at 43.
As distinguished from the result-oriented analysis of the above works, note the objectivity
of Michelman, Property,Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the EthicalFoundationof "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, PrivatePropertyand PublicRights, 81 YALE L. J.
149 (1971).
For a traditional example of progressional change, see generally Euclid v. Ambler Realty,
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1927).
Several excellent articles are contained in a Symposium Issue of the North Carolina Law
Review. Particularly notable are: Maloney and Ausness, The Use and Legal Significanceof
the Mean High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REV. 185 (1974);
Schoenbaum, The Management of Land and Water Use in the CoastalZone: A New Law is
Enacted in North Carolina, 53 N.C.L. REV. 275 (1974); Glenn, The CoastalArea Management Act in the Courts:A PreliminaryAnalysis, 53 N.C.L. REV. 303 (1974).
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During this transition time, a set of seemingly irreconcilable opposites
occupied the public eye. Coastal area issues proliferated in number and were
increasingly cast in the extremes of discontent. Processes of deliberation, compromise, and reasoned decisionmaking had not yet caught up with these issues,
and discussion was phrased in terms of stark contrasts: "preservation" or
Conservationists and
"development," "regulation" or "confiscation."
developers alike perceived the issues thus framed as both explosive and implosive and each group devoured its own kind as well as the opposition in the
attempt to legitimize and ensure the realization of its particular goals and
strongly held beliefs. 'I
A quandary so fundamental that it affects basic social and environmental
values presents few solutions from within. Time is the obvious neutral factor
in the reconciliation of these conflicts. Only time can transmute extremes into
reasoned legal doctrine. Equally important, time is necessary for an external
analysis of possible alternative systems of control and allocation of coastal
area resources. Such analysis is absolutely necessary, but to be valid it must, so
far as possible, assume neither the givens nor the goals of the present controversy. An external analysis must approach, ab initio, all questions affecting
the structuring and allocating of coastal area resources.12
A series of interrelated questions can be used to illustrate the extent to
which external considerations should be imposed on such an inquiry. Should
any form of private property exist in the coastal area? 3 If so, what are the
desirable sets of expectations based on property rights that could conceivably
be created in the private sector, and how do these compare with property rights
now in existence? 1' Particular emphasis must be given here to the recognition
of all relevant values in the allocative process and the dislocation (if any) which
would occur in the event of a transition from one set of property expectations
11. A recent victim of the process of being devoured both by his own kind and by others is exemplified by the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation in New York, who resigned in
1976. Courier Express (Buffalo), May 1976, at 13, 16.
12. The need to so structure these issues and set them forth for the reader's consideration constitutes one of the original reasons for the first Sea Grant Law Journal. See generally Tecaff,
The Coastal Zone-Control Over Encroachments into the Tidewaters, 1 J. MARIT. L. &
COM. 241 (1970). See particularly the summary and conclusion appearing at 284-290. An
early attempt at management analysis can be found in Knight, Proposed Systems of Coastal
Zone Management: An Interim Analysis, 3 NAT. RES. LAW. 599 (1970).
13. Although the issues are not phrased in this manner, a broader reading of F. BOSSELMAN,
D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 10, and Jaffe, supra note 10, could lead to a reconstruction of their underlying issues as the asking of this question.
14. The decision of the court in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wisc.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1973),
could be compared with any of the other three cases cited in note 3 supra-Johnson,
MacGibbon or S. Volpe-as decisions affecting the allocation of wetlands resources which
serve to illustrate the dichotomy between positions which exist on the issues of propertied
expectations. A more direct comparison might be, however, that of Just with the philosophy expressed in Baker v. Normanock Ass'n, 25 N.J. 407, 136 A.2d 645 (1957), which
anticipates private ownership. The icing on this cake could be supplied by a reading of
RACHLIS & MARQUSEE, THE LAND LORDS (1963). Baker and THE LAND LORDS
assume the values of fostering private ownership of land and resources in American society.
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to another. What public and private institutions is it possible to create to exercise concurrent control over the allocation and use of these resources? Finally,
what formal basis of governmental justification should evolve as warrant for
its activities in the total coastal area, and what political, legal, and social issues
lie concealed within any fundamental change in governmental theory? Further
questions could be addressed to the more traditional issues of standing, home
rule, state versus federal rights, and to the myriad related constitutional issues.
These questions, however, are not sufficiently free of the set of existing
normative biases to produce the creative thinking necessary to deal with the
fundamental changes wrought by the last decade.
The past decade may be characterized as one of extraordinary governmental frustration in the reallocation of both the power and the duties attendant upon control of the process of coastal zone management. It may be hypothesized that no one anticipated the concurrent pull of the government's
simultaneous attempt to avoid the political, economic, and environmental
pressures attendant upon such control. State and federal agencies may also
have been frustrated by internal problems of personnel limitations and program management, particularly where the thrust of an agency's involvement in
the past had been the antithesis of the duties with which it was charged under
new legislative and judicial directives. Regulatory jurisdiction also brought
with it the concomitant liability of having such regulations found by the courts
to be in excess of the constitutional limitations on the police power, and declared to be "takings."
The distinction between proper exercises of the police power and regulatory excesses ("takings") was an uncertain one inasmuch as there was a simultaneous search (1) for some appropriate level of government to exercise jurisdiction and control over the allocation of coastal resources, and (2) for a
normative answer to the question of the degree of "privateness" desirable in
the coastal area. This uncertainty reflects the rapid transmutation of social
values that has occurred in the last decade.
A series of underlying questions involved in any attempt to deal with
issues like those just noted must be based on working doctrinal materials to
ensure that what is studied has some relation to reality. The received materials
with which one must begin bear little relation to contemporary problem solving. The first task, then, is not only to collect existing doctrinal materials, but
to begin an analysis of them in the framework of contemporary methods for
problem-identification and decisionmaking.
One method of problem-identification is the collection of questions
around which there is evidenced the greatest concern. The problems thus identified can form the basis of a unified inquiry into problems of the coastal zone.
The inquiry might well be organized as follows: (1) sources and extent of private and public interests in the coastal zone; (2) governmental arrangements
for the recognition and allocation of coastal zone resources; (3) processual
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questions involving mechanisms for achieving coastal zone values; and, (4)
access to governmental and institutional decisionmaking in the coastal zone.
This first issue of the Sea Grant Law Journal is intended both to report on
the existing state of legal relations involving those issues considered, and to
provoke future studies into coastal zone processes and resources.

